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Workers’ Compensation.  Mello v. Killeavy, 205 A.3d 454 (R.I. 
2019).  Pursuant to Rhode Island General Laws section 28-29-20, 
when a Rhode Island employee collects workers’ compensation for 
an injury, his or her right to recovery based on the wrongful conduct 
of his or her fellow employees or employers is extinguished, as 
workers’ compensation benefits are meant to fully compensate the 
injured employee, and extend immunity to co-employees under the 
act’s exclusivity provision.1  Any common-law remedy is waived “if 
the employee fails to notify the employer of his or her intention to 
rely on common law recovery.”2  
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
Joshua Mello (Mello) and Sean Killeavy (Killeavy) were 
coworkers at a Rhode Island groundskeeping and cemetery 
maintenance company, Ramsay’s Inc. (Ramsay’s).3  Mello was hired 
by Ramsay’s in 2008, and Killeavy was hired in 2015.4  The two 
employees had rapport and would often engage in practical jokes 
while they were working together.5  On August 17, 2016, while 
Mello and Killeavy were working a job at St. Mary’s Cemetery in 
Bristol, Rhode Island, Killeavy, in jest, poured gasoline from a 
canister that he found on the grounds into the bathroom while 
Mello was using the facilities.6  As a practical joke, Killeavy ignited 
the gasoline with the intention of creating a “loud popping noise” in 
order to scare Mello.7  Unfortunately, Killeavy’s practical joke went 
awry when the gasoline spilled into the stall that Mello occupied 
1. Mello v. Killeavy, 205 A.3d 454, 459 (R.I. 2019) (citing 28 R.I. GEN. 
LAWS § 28-29-20). 
2. Id. at 462.
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and burst into flames, causing Mello serious injury, which 
subsequently disabled him from working for over a year.8 
On September 7, 2016, through its insurer, Ramsay’s filed for 
workers’ compensation benefits to be paid to Mello, and Mello 
accepted.9 In the meantime, Ramsay’s fired Killeavy.10 On 
September 30, 2016, after having already accepted workers’ 
compensation through his employer, Mello brought suit in 
Providence County Superior Court against Killeavy, alleging 
negligence.11  Killeavy denied Mello’s claims in his answer and on 
February 21, 2017, Killeavy filed a motion for summary judgment, 
along with a statement of undisputed facts, in which he argued that 
because Mello had accepted workers’ compensation, Mello’s 
negligence claim was barred by the exclusivity provision of Rhode 
Island General Laws section 28-29-20 (Workers’ Compensation 
Act).12 
Though he did not dispute Killeavy’s statement of undisputed 
facts, Mello contended that because Killeavy may have been on a 
lunch break when the accident occurred, he was not acting within 
his scope as an “employee” at the time, and section 28-35-58 of the 
General Laws would “allow Mello to maintain a separate cause of 
action against Killeavy as a ‘third party,’ despite Mello’s acceptance 
of workers’ compensation.”13 At Killeavy’s summary judgment 
hearing on April 21, 2017, Mello alleged that Ramsay’s provided 
workers’ compensation benefits before launching an investigation 
regarding whether or not Mello’s injury occurred while he was on a 
break.14  Mello then reiterated that Killeavy was on a lunch break 
at the time of the incident, and as such was not working in the scope 
8. Id. at 456–57.  Mello was hospitalized and treated for significant
burns.  Id. at 456. 
9. Id. at 457.  Ramsay’s, through its insurer Beacon Mutual, filed a
memorandum agreement with the Rhode Island Department of Labor and 
training for workers’ compensation benefits.  Id. 
10. Id.
11. Id.  Mello stated in his complaint that he was “at all times in the
exercise of due care and performing duties on behalf of his employer when the 
accident occurred.”  Id.  
12. Id.
13. Mello attached a correspondence which stated that breaks were
noncompensable, and there was no set time or policy dictating when employees 
should take their lunch breaks.  Id.  
14. Id.
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of his employment.15 However, the Superior Court justice 
interpreted that the exclusivity provision provided immunity to 
employees and employers and that there was no exception to this 
immunity.16  Therefore, Mello could not maintain his suit against 
Killeavy.17  On April 27, 2017, Mello appealed to the Rhode Island 
Supreme Court (the Court).18 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
The Court reviewed the case de novo, as it pertained to 
“questions of statutory interpretation.”19  To determine whether 
Mello could bring a tort claim against his fellow employee despite 
having already collected workers’ compensation benefits for the 
incident, the Court considered the exclusivity provision of the 
Workers’ Compensation Act.20  The provision provides that, “[t]he 
right to compensation for an injury under chapters 29–38 . . . shall 
be in lieu of all rights and remedies as to that injury now existing, 
either at common law or otherwise against an employer, or its 
directors, officers, agents, or employees.”21  Additionally, the Court 
pointed to section 28-29-17 of the Workers’ Compensation Act, 
which provides that an employee  
shall be held to have waived his or her right of action at 
common law to recover damages for personal injuries if he 
or she has not given his or her employer at the time of the 
contract of hire . . . notice in writing that he or she claims 
that right.22 
Here, Mello, who conceded to having been injured while at 
work, and who had admitted to collecting workers’ compensation 
benefits, did not notify his employer of his desire to preserve any 
15. Id. at 458.
16. Id.  The hearing justice referenced Manzi v. State, 687 A.2d 461, 462
(R.I. 1997), which stated that the Workers’ Compensation Act “bars a plaintiff 
from filing a second cause of action on the basis of a different legal theory in 
circumstances in which a plaintiff seeks recovery for the same injuries on 
which his or her workers’ compensation claim was based.”  Id. 
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 459 (quoting State v. Hazard, 68 A.3d 479, 485 (R.I. 2013)).
20. Id.
21. Id. (quoting 28 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-29-20).
22. Id. (quoting 28 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-29-17).
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common law right to sue in accordance with section 28-29-17.23  As 
such, the Court held that summary judgment would be appropriate 
on Mello’s negligence claim against Killeavy.24  Nevertheless, Mello 
argued that under section 28-35-58, he was still able to maintain a 
suit against Killeavy, even though he received workers’ 
compensation benefits.25  Under this provision, an injured 
employee is not barred from “seeking damages from an entity not 
immune under section 28-29-20 for any loss or harm due to the 
wrongful conduct of such an entity.”26  As the basis for his 
argument, Mello contended that the omission of the word 
“employees” in section 28-35-58 implied that the legislature did not 
intend to extend immunity to co-employees when liability arose 
from conduct of a party other than the employer;27 however, this 
was complicated by the fact that section 28-35-58 is intended to 
apply to persons not made immune under section 28-29-20.28 
Employees are listed as an immune party under section 28-29-20, 
and Killeavy was Mello’s co-employee.29 
To combat this detail, Mello suggested that Killeavy was acting 
outside the scope of his employment when his conduct caused 
Mello’s injury, and as such Killeavy did not qualify as an “employee” 
under the exclusivity provision.30  Mello attempted to substantiate 
this contention by comparing his situation to D’Andrea v. 
Manpower, Inc. of Providence, in which the Court stated “that an 
employee acts within the scope of his . . . employment when ‘at the 
23. Id. at 460.
24. Id.
25. Id. “Where the injury for which compensation is payable under
chapters 29–38 of this title was caused under circumstances creating a legal 
liability in some person other than the employer to pay damages in respect of 
the injury, the employee may take proceedings, both against that person to 
recover damages and against any person liable to pay compensation under 
those chapters for that compensation, and the employee shall be entitled to 
receive both damages and compensation.”  28 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-35-58. 
26. Id. (quoting DiQuinzio v. Panciera Lease Co., 612 A.2d 40, 43 (R.I.
1992)). 
27. Id. at 460.
28. Id. (citing DiQuinzio, 612 A.2d at 43).
29. Id. at 459.
30. Id. at 458.
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time and place of the injury [the employee] was reasonably fulfilling 
the duties of his employment.’”31 
However, the Court relied on several cases to hold that there 
was no basis to create a “judicial exception” for injuries caused by 
coworkers.32  The Court first pointed to DiQuinzio v. Panciera 
Lease Co., in which an employee was injured after his co-employee 
was driving a truck that collided with another vehicle.33  In 
DiQuinzio, the Court held that the plaintiff’s cause of action against 
the third party truck leasing company was derivative of the conduct 
of the plaintiff’s co-employee, and, as such, the plaintiff could not 
maintain an action.34  Similarly, in Kong v. Kuncio, the Court held 
that the plaintiff, who was struck by his co-employee’s car in the 
employer’s parking lot, could not sue his co-employee after already 
accepting workers’ compensation benefits for the injury.35  
Although Mello relied on D’Andrea to support his argument, 
the Court held that the case was inapplicable to Mello’s situation 
because it did not involve a situation where the plaintiff was injured 
by a co-employee, and it did not involve the exclusivity clause of the 
Workers’ Compensation Act.36  The Court held that Mello waived 
his right to common-law remedy for failing to notify his employer of 
his intent to preserve it, and his acceptance of workers’ 
compensation benefits barred him from bringing a suit against his 
fellow employee for wrongful conduct.37 
COMMENTARY 
Although Mello’s link to D’Andrea is tenuous, there is an 
argument to be made that if the employee in that case was within 
his scope of employment when at the time of injury he was 
performing reasonable work-related duties, it should follow that an 
employee, such as Killeavy, who was not performing reasonable 
duties of his employment at the time of the injury was not within 
31. Id. at 462 (citing D’Andrea v. Manpower, Inc. of Providence, 249 A.2d
896, 899 (1969)). 
32. Id. at 460.
33. Id. (citing DiQuinzio, 612 A.2d at 43).
34. Id. at 460–61.
35. Id. at 462 (citing Kong v. Kuncio, 754 A.2d 103, 103).
36. Id. (citing D’Andrea, 249 A.2d at 899).
37. Id.
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the scope of his employment. Clearly, pouring gasoline into a 
bathroom and igniting it was not a reasonable employment duty of 
a cemetery groundskeeper.  The Court, however, dismissed the 
parallels drawn between the injured employee in D’Andrea and 
Mello.  It stated that D’Andrea was distinct from Mello’s case 
because it was not a situation where an injury was caused by a co-
employee and it did not involve the exclusivity provision of the 
Workers’ Compensation Act.38  
This reasoning seems to overlook Mello’s point that based on 
the D’Andrea definition of scope of employment, Killeavy would not 
be considered an employee because at the time of the injury, he was 
not performing reasonable employment duties.  Because Killeavy 
was not an “employee” at the time of injury, it could be argued that 
section 28-35-58 applied to Mello’s situation.  However, absent 
precedent specifically addressing scope of employment, and absent 
a concrete scope of employment exception under the Workers’ 
Compensation Act, the Court stated that it would not extend the 
D’Andrea standard to situations involving co-employees.39 
Additionally, the Court acknowledged that Mello addressed policy 
arguments in support of a scope of employment exception, but the 
Court did not elaborate further on what those arguments entailed, 
nor did it provide reasons for dismissing Mello’s concerns.40 
CONCLUSION 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that because the 
Plaintiff had accepted and received workers’ compensation benefits 
for his injury, the exclusivity provision of the Workers’ 
Compensation Act barred him from bringing a cause of action 
against his fellow employee for the employee’s tortious conduct. 
The Court further held that absent a “legislatively created 
exception” to the provision, it would adhere to the principle that an 
employee waives his or her common law rights if he or she fails to 
notify his or her employer of the intent to retain them. 
Kaitlyn Alger 
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
